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It is generally accepted that a liability insurer owes a duty to its in-
sured to attempt to settle a claim against the insured within the limits of
the insurance policy, in order to protect the insured from a judgment in
excess of the policy limits.' Some courts have indicated that the in-
surer's duty is to make a "good faith" attempt to settle;2 others have
said that the insurer must exercise "due care" in attempting to settle;3 a
few have suggested that an insurer should be strictly liable if it refuses
to settle a claim within the policy limits.4
Recently, the question has arisen as to whether a comparable duty
exists between a primary insurer and an excess insurer,5 and between
* Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School; A.B. Harvard, 1950; J.D., John Marshall
Law School, 1966; C.L.U. American College of Life Underwriters, 1957. The author gratefully
acknowledges the valuable assistance of his very capable Research Assistant, Paula J. Giroux
(J.D. Jan. 1982), who not only aided in the research for this article, but whose wise counsel made a
great contribution to the final editing and re-writing.
1. Most cases follow a similar pattern, illustrated by the following example. The insurance
company issues a liability policy to the insured with a limit of liability of $10,000. The claimant
sustains an injury covered by the policy, and files suit against the insured for $20,000. The insurer
has an opportunity to settle the claim for $10,000 or less, but rejects the offer in favor of going to
trial. A judgment is entered in favor of the claimant for $20,000. Because of its wrongful refusal
to settle, the insurer is held liable for the full $20,000, not just the $10,000 policy limit.
2. See notes 25-47 and accompanying text infra.
3. See note 48 and accompanying text infra.
4. See notes 49-57 and accompanying text infra.
5. The operation of excess coverage is described in cases such as Mfarwell Constr., Inc. v.
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 465 P.2d 298 (Alas. 1970); Peerless Ca. Co. v. Continental Car.
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an insured with a deductible and his insurer. Does a primary insurer
have a duty to protect the interest of the excess insurer by attempting to
settle a claim within the limit of the primary coverage?7 Does an in-
sured with a deductible clause in his policy have a duty to protect the
interest of his insurer by attempting to settle the claim within the
amount of the deductible?8
Clearly, the general trend throughout the country toward higher dol-
lar judgments will lead to more cases involving these issues. An in-
creasing number of insureds are seeking, or are forced to accept, large
self-insured retentions, with insurance coverage coming into the picture
only when claims exceed this deductible amount.9 Insureds are also
buying large amounts of excess coverage, and these excess policies are
involved in more claims because of the substantial increase in the dol-
lar amount of the claims. Indeed, it is becoming unusual for the
amount of an injured person's claim to be within the limits of the pri-
mary insurance policy.
Conflict of interest is inherent in these relationships."0 As a claim
reaches or exceeds the amount of a policy limit or deductible, the in-
centive for the party with the first layer of coverage to litigate becomes
strong, because of the ceiling on its exposure to loss. No more can be
lost by litigating than would have been lost by settlement, and there is
the possibility of gain if the ultimate judgment falls short of the ceiling.
On the other hand, the interest of the party responsible for the addi-
tional amount of any judgment is in direct conflict, and is always best
served by settlement within the ceiling, or as near thereto as possible.
This article will first examine the duty of an insurer to its insured to
attempt to settle claims, and will then consider the duty of a primary
insurer to its excess insurer, and of an insured to his insurer to settle.
This article will then suggest that the relationships between insured,
primary insurer and excess insurer engender reciprocal obligations to
Co., 144 Cal. App. 2d 617, 301 P.2d 602 (1956); and Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 245
Or. 30, 420 P.2d 66 (1966). Briefly, an excess policy provides coverage only after the full amount
of the underlying primary coverage has been exhausted.
6. Most people are familiar with the use of deductible clauses in automobile and property
insurance policies. Deductibles are also being used with increasing frequency in liability insur-
ance policies, especially those of large business firms.
7. The duty to attempt to settle would also include an obligation to tender the full amount
of the policy coverage to effectuate a settlement in excess of the policy limit if the excess insurer is
willing to contribute the remainder of the settlement.
8. Here also, the duty would include an obligation to tender the full amount of the deducti-
ble if the insurer is willing to pay the balance of the settlement offer.
9. This is particularly true in the products liability area. See generall, Insurance Co. of N.
Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980)(asbestos manufacturer had
$100,000 deductible in policy).
10. For further discussion of conflict of interest, see generally Haskall & Pope, The Insurer'r"Conflict of Interest" Dilemma, 65 ILL. B.J. 220 (1976); Snow, Excess Liabilio,-Criscl and Lysik,
36 INS. CoUNs. J. 51 (1969).
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give full consideration to the interests of the other parties.' Finally, a
proposal will be made that each of the parties should be strictly liable
for any injury to another party resulting from an attempt to minimize
its own liability.
THE INSURER'S DUTY TO SETTLE
In the early years of the twentieth century, an insurer enjoyed almost
total immunity from any suit for its failure to settle a case within the
policy limits. Most, if not all, courts held that the insurer was free to
decide not only the question of whether to settle, but also whether to
litigate.12 A description of the insurer's duties in an early case i" suc-
cinctly captures this early attitude: "The insurer was under no obliga-
tion to pay in advance of trial, and the decision whether to settle or to
try was committed to it."' 4 This view is probably no longer accepted in
any jurisdiction, however.
Increasing recognition of the inequities of the bargaining power of
the parties"5 has led the courts gradually to redefine the insurer's duties
with respect to settlement offers. The contemporary general rule is
that, under certain circumstances, an insurer's rejection of a claimant's
settlement demand will render the insurer liable for the entire amount
of any subsequent judgment.' 6 However, great difficulty arises in de-
l1. Transit Cas. Corp. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 475, 156 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1979).
12. See, e.g., Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 451, 46 S.W.2d 777, 779 (1932)(insurer
has "sole right to settle"); Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 92 Me. 574, 583,43 A.
503, 505 (1899)(insured, under policy, surrenders full and absolute control over settlement to in-
surer); C. Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286, 289, 90 A. 653, 654
(1914)(insurer is not obliged to pay prior to trial).
13. C. Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286, 90 A. 653 (1914).
14. Id at 289, 90 A. at 654. The earliest cases often dealt with the simplest solutions. Dis-
cussing only the two extremes, the courts rejected strict liability in favor of no liability for failure
to settle. See, e.g., Kingan & Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 65 Ind. App. 301, 313-14, 115 N.E. 348,
351-52 (1917); Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 92 Me. 574, 583-84, 43 A. 503,
505-06 (1899); Georgia Cas. Co. v. Cotton Mills Prods. Co., 159 Miss. 396, 412-13, 132 So. 73, 76-
77 (1931).
15. By the terms of the insurance policy complete control of the defense of the action is given
to the insurer. Ivy v. Pacific Auto Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 660, 320 P.2d 140, 146 (1958).
This includes the power to negotiate settlements, which is, perhaps, the most important element of
control, since the overwhelming majority of tort suits are settled before trial. See Note, Liability
Insurance Policy Defenses and the Duty to Defend, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1436, 1448 (1955).
16. See, eg., Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 682, 319 P.2d 69, 72 (1957);
Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 502, 323 A.2d 495, 510 (1974);
Hilker v. Western Auto Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930), a i'don rehearing, 204 Wis. 12,
235 N.W. 413 (1931).
Some jurisdictions hold that the duty owed by the insurer to the insured in the conduct of
settlement negotiations arises from the insurance contract. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.,
50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198, 200 (1958)("There is an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in every contract .... This principle is applicable to policies of insurance."); Kulack v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 47 A.D.2d 418, 420, 366 N.Y.S.2d 927, 929, rev'don other grounds, 40
N.Y.2d 140, 351 N.E.2d 735, 386 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975) ("a liability insurer... has an implied
contractual obligation to consider settlement opportunities."); Slater v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co.,
174 Ohio St. 148, 151, 187 N.E.2d 45, 48 (1962)("a liability insurer, collecting premium for the
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termining those circumstances. Currently, debate and disagreement
abound as to the standard of behavior required of the insurer in excess
liability cases and the basis of such liability. Initially, courts found in-
surers liable for failure to exercise good faith in settlement negotia-
tions.17 Some jurisdictions later moved to a negligence standard which
holds insurers liable for failure to exercise due care in handling settle-
ment negotiations.'" Recently, some courts have indicated their ap-
policy issued, owes a duty of protection and good faith to the insured in accordance with the terms
of the policy.")
However, other jurisdictions regard breach of the duty owed the insured as a tort. E.g., Fidelity
& Cas. Co. v. Gault, 196 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1952)(applying Mississippi law); Zumwalt v. Utilities
Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750 (1950); Hart v. Republic Mut. Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 185,
188, 87 N.E.2d 347, 349 (1949). For a more modem statement of such origin of the duty, see
generally Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., I1 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711
(1974). There the court stated that an insurer's duty is implied in the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing which is in every insurance contract. The covenant requires that neither party do
anything to injure the other's rights to receive the benefits of the agreement. The insurer's viola-
tion of the duty sounds in tort and allows the insured to recover for all detriment resulting from
the violation, including mental distress. Id. at 460-61, 521 P.2d at 1108-09.
17. See generally Brochstein v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 448 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1971)(apply-
ing New York law); American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 258 F.2d 709 (5th Cir.
1958)(applying Florida law); Hall v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 204 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1953)(ap-
plying Georgia law); St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. Martin, 190 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1951)(apply-
ing Oklahoma law); American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. G. A. Nichols Co., 173 F.2d 830 (10th Cir.
1949)(applying Oklahoma law); Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621
(10th Cir. 1942)(applying Oklahoma law); Farm Bureau Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Violano, 123 F.2d
692 (2d Cir. 1941) applying Vermont law); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Elmira Coal Co., 69 F.2d 616
(8th Cir. 1934)(applying Missouri law); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cook-O'Brien Constr. Co., 69 F.2d
462 (8th Cir. 1934)(applying Missouri law); Noshey v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 808 (6th
Cir. 1934)(applying Tennessee law); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446 (5th Cir.
1932)(applying Alabama law); Board of Educ. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 293 F. Supp. 541
(D.NJ. 1968); Kaudem v. Allstate Ins. Co., 277 F. Supp. 83 (D.N.J. 1967); Christian v. Preferred
Accident Ins. Co., 89 F. Supp. 888 (N.D. Cal. 1950); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Henderson, 82 Ariz.
335, 313 P.2d 404 (1957); Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511
(1973); Campbell v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1974); Koppie v. Allied
Mut. Ins. Co., 210 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1973); Kohlstedt v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 258 Iowa
337, 139 N.W.2d 184 (1965); Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777 (1932); Davis
v. Maryland Cas. Co., 16 La. App. 253, 133 So. 769 (1931); Abrams v. Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.,
298 Mass. 141, 10 N.E.2d 82 (1937); City of Wakefield v. Globe Indem. Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225
N.W. 643 (1929); Larson v. Anchor Cas. Co., 249 Minn. 339, 82 N.W.2d 376 (1957); Zumwalt v.
Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750 (1950); Olson v. Union Fire Ins. Co., 174 Neb. 375,
118 N.W.2d 318 (1962); Bowers v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 51 N.J. 62, 237 A.2d 857 (1968);
Knobloch v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 38 N.Y.2d 471, 344 N.E.2d 364, 381 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1976);
Slater v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 174 Ohio St. 148, 187 N.E.2d 45 (1962); Radcliffe v. Franklin
Nat'l Ins. Co., 208 Or. 1,298 P.2d 1002 (1956); Cowden v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 389 Pa. 459, 134
A.2d 223 (1957); Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346 (1933);
Kunkel v. United Sec. Ins. Co., 84 S.D. 116, 168 N.W.2d 723 (1969); Alford v. National Emblem
Ins. Co., 225 Tenn. 379, 469 S.W.2d 375 (1971); Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 109 Vt. 481,
1 A.2d 817 (1938); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Price, 206 Va. 749, 146 S.E.2d 220 (1966); Berk v.
Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 245 Wis. 597, 15 N.W.2d 834 (1944).
18. Seegeneraly State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smoot, 381 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1957)(ap-
plying Georgia law); Ballard v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Co., 86 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1936)(applying
Wisconsin law); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Wyoming Valley Paper Co., 84 F.2d 633 (1st Cir. 1936)(ap-
plying New Hampshire law); Blue Bird Taxi Corp. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 26 F. Supp. 808
(E.D.S.C. 1939); Wilson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 145 Me. 370, 76 A.2d 111 (1950); Dumas v.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 111 N.H. 43, 274 A.2d 781 (1971); Highway Ins. Underwriters v.
Lufkin-Beaumont Motor Coaches, Inc., 215 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Ct. App. 1948).
Some cases have recognized both "bad faith" and "negligence" standards. See generally Fidel-
ity & Cas. Co. v. Gault, 196 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1952)(applying Mississippi law); Jessen v.
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proval of a strict liability standard,19 though no jurisdiction has
expressly adopted and applied such a rule.2 °
Typically, the insurance contract prohibits the insured from settling
or interfering with the insurer's negotiations without the insurer's con-
sent.21 Thus since the insurer has the right to defend and settle all
claims, the courts have held that the insurer also has a corresponding
duty.22 Under principles of common law, every contract imposes an
obligation on the parties to the agreement to perform their respective
duties with care, skill, reasonableness and good faith.23 A duty is im-
plied in every contractual relationship "that neither party shall do any-
thing which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the
other party to receive the fruits of the contract; in other words, in every
contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing."'24
O'Daniel, 210 F. Supp. 317 (D. Mont. 1962); Waters v. American Cas. Co., 261 Ala. 252,73 So. 2d
524 (1953); American Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Shook, 247 Ark. 1082, 449 S.W.2d 402 (1970);
Olympia Fields Country Club v. Bankers Indem. Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App. 649, 60 N.E.2d 896 (1945);
Rector v. Husted, 214 Kan. 230, 519 P.2d 634 (1974); Rutter v. King, 57 Mich. App. 152, 226
N.W.2d 79 (1974); Farmers Gin Co. v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 186 Miss. 747, 191 So. 415
(1939); Boling v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 173 Okla. 160, 46 P.2d 916 (1935); Hilker v. Western
Auto Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1,231 N.W. 257 (1931). One court held that a defendant was "negligent to
the extent of bad faith." Tully v. Travelers Ins. Co., 118 F. Supp. 568 (N.D. Fla. 1954). Others
have expressed the opinion that negligence is one factor to consider in determining bad faith.
19. See generally Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967); Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America, 65 N.J. 474,323 A.2d 495 (1974).
20. Some courts have expressly disavowed the standard. See, e.g., DeGraw v. State Sec. Ins.
Co., 40 111. App. 3d 26, 37, 351 N.E.2d 302, 311-12 (1976); Knobloch v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 38
N.Y.2d 471, 479, 344 N.E.2d 364, 369, 381 N.Y.S.2d 433, 437-38 (1976).
21. A typical liability insurance policy provides:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall be-
come legally obligated to pay as damages because of
A. bodily injury
B. property damage
... caused by an occurrence, and the company shall have the right and duty to defend
any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of bodily injury or property
damage ... and may make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it
deems expedient.
DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ANNOTATED COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
POLICY 67 (1979); see Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 870, 110 CaL Rptr. 511, 519
(1973) (interpreting such provisions as giving the insurer exclusive control of settlement and
preventing the insured from exercising independent action). For a general discussion of the in-
surer's duty to defend, see 7C J. APPELMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §4682 (1979); 14 G.
COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §51:32 (2d ed. 1965); Note, Liability Insurance Policy
Defenses and the Duty to Defend, 68 HARv. L. REV. 1436 (1955).
22. See Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
23. Bak-A-Lum Corp. of Am. v. Alcoa Bldg., 66 N.J. 123, 129-30, 351 A.2d 349, 352 (1976)
(quoting Associate Group Life, Inc. v. Catholic War Veterans, 61 N.J. 150, 153, 293 A.2d 382, 384
(1972)).
24. 5 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §670, at 159 (3d ed. W. Jaeger
1961).
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TESTS FOR BREACH OF THE INSURER'S DUTY TO THE INSURED
A. Bad Faith-Fraud
While the vast majority of jurisdictions today apply a good faith
standard in excess liability cases,2 5 there is no agreement as to what
conduct on the insurance company's part constitutes bad faith. It has
been said: "Bad faith is a general and somewhat indefinite term. It has
no constricted meaning. It cannot be defined with exactness. It is not
simply bad judgment. It is not merely, negligence."
2 6
Some courts have equated bad faith with fraudulent behavior by the
insurer,2 7 involving actual intent and conscious wrongdoing.28 By the
very nature of this bad faith test, an insured's recovery for his insurer's
refusal to settle was difficult. The test did not put much pressure on
recalcitrant insurance companies to settle, nor did it hold insurers to a
high standard of conduct. As a result, most jurisdictions have adopted
a more liberal standard for testing bad faith.
B. The Modern Test of Good Faith
Many jurisdictions have rejected the traditional view that bad faith
equates with fraud, and have focused instead upon the insurer's fiduci-
ary duties to the insured. These jurisdictions define bad faith in terms
of the breach of the fiduciary duties owed to the insured. 9 Such an
approach favors the insured since proving ill will is very difficult, and
courts are reluctant to find fraud.
Most jurisdictions now define good faith by stating that the insurer
must give equal consideration to its interests and to the interests of its
insured,3" but some go further by insisting that the company give para-
mount consideration to the interests of its insured to the disfavor of its
25. See, e.g., Transport Ins. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 496 F.2d 265 (6th Cir.
1974)(applying Michigan law); Peterson v. Allcity Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1972)(applying
New York law); Fulton v. Woodford, 26 Ariz. App. 17, 545 P.2d 979 (1976); Kooyman v. Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 267 N.W.2d 403 (Iowa 1978); Colsch v. Travelers Ins. Co., 361 Mass. 873,
281 N.E.2d 593 (1972); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Lundquist, 293 Minn. 274, 198 N.W.2d 543
(1972); Slater v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 174 Ohio St. 148, 187 N.E.2d 45 (1962); Gedeon v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 410 Pa. 55, 188 A.2d 320 (1963).
26. Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 416, 8 N.E.2d 895, 907 (1937).
27. See, eg., Harrod v. Meridian Mut. Co., 389 S.W.2d 74,76 (Ky. 1964); Slater v. Motorists
Mut. Ins. Co., 174 Ohio St. 148, 151, 187 N.E.2d 45, 48 (1962); Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas.
Co., 108 Vt. 269, 286, 187 A. 788, 796 (1936).
28. See, e.g., 108 Vt. at 286, 187 A. at 796 (bad faith refers to a real and actual state of mind
capable of both direct and circumstantial proof); Berk v. Milwaukee Auto Ins. Co., 245 Wis. 597,
601, 15 N.W.2d 834, 836 (1944)("[b]ad faith is a species of fraud, and the evidence to sustain a
finding thereof must be clear, satisfactory, and convincing").
29. See generally United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Lembke, 328 F.2d 569 (10th Cir.
1964)(applying Colorado law); Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69
(1957); Cernocky v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 69 I. App. 2d 196, 216 N.E.2d 198 (1966).
30. See generally Hernandez v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 346 F.2d 154 (5th Cir.
1965)(applying Louisiana law); Ballard v. Citizens Cas. Co., 196 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1952)(applying
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own when the two conflict.3 ' Definitions of the insurer's duty to con-
sider the insured's interests as either paramount or equal to its own do
not provide a very meaningful or clear distinction.32 However, many
courts state that the insurer can demonstrate its good faith in handling
negotiations for settlement by acting as if there were no policy limits
applicable to the claim and as if the risk of loss was entirely its own.33
Conversely, bad faith is normally demonstrated by proving that the
risk of an unfavorable result was out of proportion to the chances of a
favorable outcome.34
C Caifornia Cases
Despite the fact that California adheres to the "equal consideration"
language,35 in practice it applies the strictest excess liability rules. In
1967,36 California adopted the Keeton standard,37 which requires that
an insurer's settlement conduct conform to that of an "ordinary pru-
dent insurer with no policy limit. ' 38 But California has gone a step
further than most other states which have adopted this standard.39
When a judgment over the policy limits is rendered, California law
applies a rebuttable presumption that any previous settlement demand
Illinois law); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Little, 103 Ariz. 435, 443 P.2d 690
(1968).
31. See Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 373, 228 S.W.2d 750, 756 (1950). See
generally Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America, 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495
(1974); Tiger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346 (1933).
32. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibilityfor Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1136,
1141 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Keeton]. Professor Keeton has suggested that there is no practi-
cal difference in the results, since under either standard the question is one for the jury.
33. See generally Bollinger v. Nuss, 202 Kan. 326, 449 P.2d 502 (1969)(insurer must evaluate
claim without looking at policy limits and as though it would be responsible for entire amount of
any judgment rendered on claim); Lange v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 290 Minn. 61, 185 N.W.2d 881
(197 1)(insurer must view situation as it would if there were no policy limits applicable to claim);
Bowers v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 51 N.J. 62, 237 A.2d 857 (1968)(where adverse verdict proba-
bly will exceed limits, insurer can refuse settlement in "good faith" only by treating settlement
offer as if insured had full coverage for whatever verdict might be recovered); Crabb v. National
Indem. Co., 87 S.D. 222, 205 N.W.2d 633 (1973)(insurer must in good faith view the situation as it
would if there were no policy limits applicable to the claim).
34. See generally Eastham v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 273 Or. 600, 540 P.2d 364, rehearing
denied, 273 Or. 600, 542 P.2d 895 (1975).
35. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 659, 328 P.2d 198, 201 (1958).
36. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 431-32, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16
(1967).
37. Keeton, supra note 32, at 1147.
38. Keeton, supra note 32, at 1147.
39. See generally Board of Educ. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 293 F. Supp. 541 (D.N.J.
1968); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Little, 103 Ariz. 435, 442, 443 P.2d 690,
697 (1968); Koppie v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 210 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1973); Rector v. Husted, 214
Kan. 230, 519 P.2d 634 (1974); Lange v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 290 Minn. 61, 185 N.W.2d 881
(1971); Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484, 56 A.2d 57 (1947); Rova Farms
Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 NJ. 474,323 A.2d 495 (1974); Radcliffe v. Franklin Nat'l Ins.
Co., 208 Or. 1, 298 P.2d 1002 (1956); Cowden v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 223
(1957); Crabb v. National Indem. Co., 87 S.D. 222, 205 N.W.2d 633 (1973).
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under the limits was reasonable.4° Thus, in excess liability cases in Cal-
ifornia, the insurer bears the burden of showing that the settlement de-
mand was unreasonable. 41 The resulting standard is only a small step
removed from strict liability, as recent cases have confirmed.42
As a California court pointed out, applying the "equal considera-
tion" doctrine calls for an assessment of factors such as:
The strength of the injured claimant's case on the issues of liability
and damages; attempts by the insurer to induce the insured to con-
tribute to a settlement; failure of the insurer to properly investigate
the circumstances so as to ascertain the evidence against the insured;
the insurer's rejection of advice of its own attorney or agent; failure
of the insurer to inform the insured of a compromise offer; the
amount of financial risk to which each party is exposed in the event
of a refusal to settle; the fault of the insured in inducing the insurer's
rejection of the compromise offer by misleading it as to the facts; and
any other factors tending to establish or negate bad faith on the part
of the insurer.43
Broad support is also developing for the view that an insurance com-
pany must take more than a passive role, and "that, in some circum-
stances at least it has an affirmative duty to seize whatever reasonable
opportunity may present itself to protect its insured from excess liabil-
ity."" The insurer must explore all settlement possibilities and, if nec-
40. 66 Cal. 2d at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
41. This presumably means that the insurer must show that accepting the settlement demand
would not be consistent with rational settlement behavior, since an insurer with no limits generally
would be expected to exercise rational settlement behavior. The insurer would therefore be re-
quired to show either that the damages should have been substantially less than those actually
awarded in the tort suit, or that there was significant uncertainty about the outcome of the liability
issue in the tort suit, or both. It is unlikely, following a tort suit won by the claimant, that the
insurer could successfully show either.
42. See generally Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9,
538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975). It has been argued, in fact, that Johansen and other post-
Crisci cases have established an "unannounced" policy of strict liability in California. Note, Jo-
hansen v. California State Automobile Association: Has Calfornia Adopted Strict Liabilityfor an
Insurer's Failure to Settle? 27 HAsTNGs L.J. 895, 911 (1976).
43. Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 689, 319 P.2d 69, 75 (1957). Besides
the seven standards enunciated in Brown, legal writers have offered other factors which could be
considered. Jarrett, Lawsuitsfor WrongfulRe/usalto De/endor to Settle, 28 INS. COUNS. J. 58, 65
(1961) enumerated eleven additional factors affecting good faith: did the insurer reject a compro-
mise offer after an excess verdict had been entered; does the insurer have reinsurance as protec-
tion; did the insurer advise its insured to transfer his assets to parties immune from a potential
excess judgment; did the insurer make any remark regarding the low limit of the policy as being
an advantage of the case; did the insurer make a subjective evaluation of the claimant's witnesses;
did the insurer favor going to trial because the insured was judgment-proof; did the insurer reject
a settlement because all the plaintiffs refused to join; did the insurer increase its reserves after it
rejected a settlement offer, did the insurer establish an arbitrary settlement figure lower than the
policy limits; did the insurer have a representative at the trial to increase the settlement offer if the
trial went badly- and, did the insurer indicate a willingness to offer the full amount and then fail to
do so or did the agent fail to offer all that was available?
See also CAL. INS. CODE §790.03(h)(l)-(15) in which the state legislature codified 13 unfair
claims settlement practices.
44. Alt v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 71 Wis. 2d 340, 350, 237 N.W.2d 706, 713 (1976).
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essary, initiate negotiations with the claimant.4" The insurer should not
bargain defensively, but should take positive steps toward settling
within the policy limits.46 Breach of either of these duties will indicate
bad faith, and the burden will shift to the insurer to demonstrate that
there was no possibility of effecting a settlement within the policy limits
or at a higher figure to which the insured might have contributed.47
D. Negligence
Some courts frame the insurer's duty to the insured only in terms of
good faith, while others apply a negligence test requiring both good
faith and reasonable care. Under the latter test, an insurer incurs ex-
cess liability when "it fails to settle when a reasonable man with unlim-
ited exposure in the exercise of due care would have settled. 48 In
practice, there is probably little distinction between the two standards
as the courts apply them to fact situations. Because good faith is a state
of mind which can be established only through examination of con-
duct, the same conduct which one court finds to be negligent is likely to
be found by another court to be indicative of bad faith.
E. Strict Liability
In response to the difficulties encountered in imposing liability for
the breach of an insurance carrier's settlement duty, strict liability for
this failure has been urged in some jurisdictions. In suggesting strict
liability, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Rova Farms Resort, Inc.
v. Investors Insurance Co., stated that49
where the carrier chooses not to offer the limits of coverage, one won-
ders whether it should not bear the unhappy financial result of that
unilateral decision, since it alone profits from the opposite result of
the gamble. This result would enable the insurer to pursue its own
interests in great measure without sacrificing those of its insured so
long as it was clear by whom the burden of mistake should be borne.
The kind of rule we project, which would settle the nagging conflicts
of interest under present law, has already been regarded favorably by
some.
50
45. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America, 65 N.J. 474, 493, 496, 323 A.2d
495, 505, 507 (1974). See also State Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rowland, 221 Tenn. 421, 427 S.W.2d 30
(1968)(even if claimant does not offer to settle within policy limit, insurer may be guilty of bad
faith if it does not try to settle, where liability is clear and there is good chance of excess
judgment).
46. 65 N.J. at 495-96, 323 A.2d at 506-07.
47. Id at 496, 323 A.2d at 507.
48. Radio Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Lincoln Mut. Ins. Co., 31 N.J. 299, 303, 157 A.2d 319, 322
(1960).
49. 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495 (1974).
50. Id at 500, 323 A.2d at 509-10.
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The California courts have also indicated support for a strict liability
standard5 After finding ample evidence of bad faith in Crisci,52 the
court went on to state that "there is more than a small amount of ele-
mentary justice in a rule that would require that, in this situation where
the insurer's and insured's interests necessarily conflict, the insurer,
which may reap the benefits of its determination not to settle, should
also suffer the detriments of its decision.
53
In a later case 5 4 an appellate court in California indicated its ap-
proval of a rule which comes very close to strict liability:
An insurer who denies coverage does so at its own risk, and, al-
though its position may not have been entirely groundless, if the de-
nial is found to be wrongful it is liable for the full amount which will
compensate the insured for all detriment caused by the insurer's
breach of the express and implied obligations of the contract.
In affirming,56 the California Supreme Court based its decision on a
finding of bad faith, as had the appellate court, but it said nothing that
would indicate any disapproval of the proposed rule of strict liability.
Although no state has expressly adopted and applied a strict liability
standard, a review of the excess liability cases in California reveals that
the application of the current "bad faith" test leads to almost certain
recovery of the excess judgment when the insurance company has re-
jected a settlement offer within the policy limits.5 7 In view of this, a
straightforward adoption of the strict liability rule would seem to be a
sensible approach.5 s
51. Contra, Hodges v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 198 Cal. App. 2d 564, 576, 18 Cal. Rptr.
17,24 (1962)(extending liability to every case where insurer rejects offer of settlement below policy
limits is not necessary for protection of insured's interests).
52. See generally Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967).
53. Id at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
54. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha, 63 Cal. App. 3d 659, 133 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1976).
55. Id at 675, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
56. 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1979).
57. In only two reported California cases in recent years was the insurer absolved of liability
for the excessjudgment: Coe v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d 981, 136 Cal. Rptr. 331
(1977) and Hodges v. Standard-ccident Ins. Co., 198 Cal. App. 2d 564, 18 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1962).
There are many California cases in which the insurer was held liable, see generally Comment,
Approaching Strict Liability of Insurerfor Refusal to Settle Within Policy Limits, 47 NEB. L. REv.
705 (1968); Note, Insurer's Liablity,/or Refusal to Settle: Beyond Strict Liability, 50 S. CAL. L.
REv. 751 (1977); Comment, L 0ability in Excess of Insurance Policy Limits, Who Bears the Rlsk of
Litigation?, 12 TOLEDO L. Rav. 101 (1980).
58. See notes 146-156 and accompanying text infra. Many commentators have expressed
support for the strict liability standard. See, e.g., Kelly, The Workable Sanction and Solution in
Excess Liability Cases: Strict Liabilityfor Insurance Carriers, 10 U.S.F. L. Rav. 159 (1975); Levit,
The Crisci Case-Something Old, Something New, 1968 INs. L. J. 12; Locke & Austin, Handling
theExcess Coverage Situationfor the Insurer, 36 INs. CoONs. J. 51 (1969); Meyer, Gray v. Nation-
wide & Beyond, 71 DIcK. L. REv. 257 (1967); Schwartz, Statutory Strict Li ablityfor an Insurer's
Failure-to Settle: A BalancedPlan/or an UnresolvedProblem, 1975 DuKE L.J. 901; Snow, Excess
Liabilty-Crisci and Lysick, 36 INs. CouNs. J. 51 (1969); Snyder, Defensein Excess ofPolic Limit
Litigation, 18 FED'N INS. CouNs. Q. 9 (Winter 1967-68); Note, Recent Developments in the Excess
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DUTY OF PRIMARY INSURER TO EXCESS INSURER
A. Is There a Duty?
When the primary insurer fails to settle at or near its policy limits
and negligently or in bad faith elects to take its chances with a possible
excess verdict, the excess insurance carrier is put in the same position as
the insured. Neither may legally or contractually control any of the
proceedings in the lawsuit, while both are going to have to pay the
amount of judgment in excess of the primary policy limit.
Because of its greater knowledge and experience in insurance mat-
ters, an excess carrier might sometimes be held by the courts to a
greater degree of responsibility for looking out for itself than the in-
sured.59 However, the relationship between an excess insurer and the
primary insurer has usually been based upon equitable subrogation
wherein the excess insurer stands in the shoes of its insured.60 In view
of that, an excess carrier should not be charged with any superior
knowledge. Yet, it is plain that judges and juries, being human, cannot
look at an insurance company and see it the same as they see an indi-
vidual insured.
In any case, it would seem that the excess carrier should be in exactly
the same position as an individual insured because it cannot legally
force the primary insurer to settle.61 It is true that the excess insurer
could contribute to a settlement within the policy limits on potentially
serious cases, but the same is true as to the insured and, by doing so,
both find themselves in a distastefully compromising situation, espe-
cially in reference to the excess carrier who may be setting a precedent
for the future.
The great weight of authority supports the existence of a duty owed
Judgment Suit, 36 BROOKLYN L. REV. 464 (1970); Note, Johansen v. California State Automobile
Association: Has Calfornia Adopted Strict Liability for an Znsurer's Failure to Settle?, 27 HAS-
TINGS LJ. 895 (1976); Note, Insurance" Duty of Liability Insurer to Accept Offer of Settlement
Within Policy Limits, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 198 (1958); Comment, Insurance-Liability of Insurer for
Judgment in Excess of Policy Limits, 48 MICH. L. Ray. 95 (1949); Comment, Approaching Strict
Liability of Insurerfor Refusing to Settle Within Policy Limits, 47 NEB. L. REv. 705 (1968); Com-
ment, Insurance-Excess Recovery-Liability Insurer Who Refused Settlement Within the Policy
Limits Held Liable for Excess Recovery and Mental Damages, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 199 (1968);
Comment, Insurance: Liabilityfor Refusal to Settle Within the Policy Limits-The Crisci Case and
Oklahoma Law, 22 OKLA. L. REV. 440 (1969); Note, An Insurance Company/r Duty to Settle:
Qualfled or Absolute?, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 120 (1968).
59. See generally Knepper, Relationshps Between Primary and Excess Carriers in Cases
Where Judgment or Settlement Value Will Exhaust the Primary Coverage, 20 INs. COUNS. J. 207
(1953).
60. Eg., Peter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347 (C.D. Cal. 1974). See notes 67-75 and
accompanying text infra.
61. Normally, the primary carrier has complete control of the defense, both in cases where
there is excess insurance and i cases where there is not. See note 21 supra.
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by a primary insurer to an excess insurer.62 The case most often cited
for this principle, American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. AllAmerican Bus
Lines, Inc. ,63 involved an injured party who obtained a verdict in ex-
cess of the primary policy limits after the primary insurer had refused
to settle. The court held that an excess insurer could recover against
the primary insurer, where the primary insurer was guilty of bad faith
in not settling the claim within the limits of the primary policy.64
B. Source of Duty
Most of the cases which have recognized that a primary insurer may
be responsible to an excess insurer for an excess judgment have found
that the right of the excess carrier was derived from subrogation65 or
assignment.6
Peter v. Travelers Insurance Co.' was one of the first cases to clearly
62. See generally Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 574 F.2d 469 (9th Cir.
1978)(applying Oregon law); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 285 F.2d 579
(10th Cir. 1960)(applying Oklahoma law); American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. All American Bus Lines,
Inc., 179 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1950)(applying Oklahoma law); Offshore Logistics Services, Inc. v.
Arkwright-Boston Mfrs Mut. Ins. Co., 469 F. Supp. 1099 (E.D. La. 1979)(dictum); Vencill v. Con-
tinental Cas. Co., 433 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D.W. Va. 1977); Transport Ins. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co., 340 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Mich. 1972); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v.
American Cas. Co., 390 So. 2d 761 (Fla. App. 1980); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 389
So. 2d 272 (Fla. App. 1980); Citizens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 29 Mich. App. 91, 185
N.W.2d 99 (1970)(dictum); Continental Cas. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 5, 238 N.W.2d 862
(1976); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 116 N.H. 806, 373 A.2d 339 (1977); Western World
Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 150 N.J. Super. 481, 376 A.2d 177 (1977); Estate of Penn v. Amalga-
mated Gen. Agencies, 148 N.J. Super. 419, 372 A.2d 1124 (1977); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 977, 375 N.E.2d 733, 404 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1978); Home
Ins. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 68 Misc. 2d 737, 327 N.Y.S.2d 745, afd without opinion, 39 A.D.2d
678, 332 N.Y.S.2d 1003, leave to appeal denied, 31 N.Y.2d 641 (1972); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Ohio St. 2d 221, 404 N.E.2d 759 (1980)(dictum). See notes 90-100 and
accompanying text infra for discussion of the California cases.
63. 190 F.2d 234 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 851 (1951).
64. Id at 238. Those jurisdictions which have recognized that the primary carrier owes a
duty to the excess carrier have measured the performance of the duty by the same standard ap-
plied to the duty of the primary carrier to the insured, that is, bad faith, negligence, etc.
65. See generally Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 574 F.2d 469 (9th Cir.
1978)(applying Oregon law); Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1977)(applying
California law); American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. All American Bus Lines, Inc., 190 F.2d 234(10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 851 (195 l)(applying Oklahoma law); Vencill v. Continental Cas. Co.,
433 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D.W. Va. 1977); Peter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347 (C.D. Cal.
1974); Transport Ins. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 340 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Mich. 1972);
Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group, 76 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 143 Cal. Rptr. 415
(1978); General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. American Cas. Co., 390 So. 2d 761 (Fla.
App. 1980); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 389 So. 2d 272 (Fla. App. 1980); Continental
Cas. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 5, 238 N.W.2d 862 (1976); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reserve Ins.
Co., 116 N.H. 806, 373 A.2d 339 (1977); Estate of Penn v. Amalgamated Gen. Agencies, 148 N.J.
Super. 419, 372 A.2d 1124 (1977); Home Ins. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 68 Misc. 2d 737, 327
N.Y.S.2d 745, a'd without opinion, 39 A.D.2d 678, 332 N.Y.S.2d 1003, leave to appeal denied, 31
N.Y.2d 641 (1972); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Ohio St. 2d 221, 404 N.E.2d
759 (1980).
66. See generally Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 116 N.H. 806, 373 A.2d 339 (1977).
67. 375 F. Supp. 1347 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
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articulate that the source of the duty was subrogation.68 The court
stated that "the duty owed the excess insurer is identical to that owed
the insured. ' 69 Similarly, the court in Continental Casualty Co. v. Re-
serve Insurance Co.7 0 said: "We hold that an excess insurer is subro-
gated to the insured's rights against a primary insurer for breach of the
primary insurer's good-faith duty to settle."'" This does not mean that
an excess insurer can force the primary insurer to pay its full policy
limit in settlement in every case, or risk the threat of liability for the full
amount of a possible judgment if settlement is refused.72 It merely
means that it must tender all or part of its policy limit if that is what a
prudent insurer with a "no limit" policy would do.73
When there is no excess insurer, the insured becomes his own excess
insurer, and his single primary insurer owes him a duty of good faith
in protecting him from an excess judgment and personal liability. If
the insuredpurchases excess coverage, he in effect substitutes an excess
insurer for himself It follows that the excess insurer should assume
the rights as well as the obligations of the insured in that position.74
Nor will it suffice for the primary insurer to argue that the insured
has suffered no loss to which the excess insurer can be subrogated. It is
not necessary that the subrogor-insured suffered actual loss; "it is re-
quired only that he would have suffered loss had the subrogee (excess
insurer) not discharged the liability or paid the loss."
75
Other theories which have been advanced are that the excess carrier
is a third party beneficiary of the contract between the insured and the
68. The court stated that the requirements for subrogation, under California law, are:
(1) The insured has suffered a loss for which the party to be charged is liable, either
because the latter is a wrongdoer whose act or omission caused the loss or because he is
legally responsible to the insured for the loss caused by the wrongdoer, (2) the insurer, in
whole or in part, has compensated the insured for the same loss for which the party to be
charged is liable; (3) the insured has an existing, assignable cause of action against the
party to be charged, which action the insured could have asserted for his own benefit had
he not been compensated for his loss by the insurer, (4) the insurer has suffered damages
caused by the act or omission upon which the liability of the party to be charged de-
pends; (5) justice requires that the loss should be entirely shifted from the insurer to the
party to be charged, whose equitable position is inferior to that of the insurer, and
(6) the insurer's damages are in a stated sum, usually the amount it has paid to its in-
sured, assuming the payment was not voluntary and was reasonable. Patent Scaffolding
Co. v. William Simpson Constr. Co., 256 Cal. App. 2d 506, 509, 64 Cal. Rptr. 187, 190
(1967).
375 F. Supp. at 1350.
69. 375 F. Supp. at 1350.
70. 307 Minn. 5, 238 N.W.2d 862 (1976).
71. Id at 8, 238 N.W.2d at 864.
72. See St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. Martin, 190 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1951).
73. See notes 32-37 and accompanying text supra.
74. Continental Cas. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 5, 8-9, 238 N.W.2d 862, 864 (1976)
(emphasis added).
75. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group, 76 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 1044, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 415, 423 (1978).
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primary insurer,76 or that the primary insurer owes a direct duty to the
excess insurer without regard to subrogation. 77 A California court78
clearly recognized the existence of a duty to the excess insurer by stat-
ing that there is a three way relationship creating reciprocal obligations
among insured, primary insurer, and excess insurer.79 Still other courts
have simply stated that the duty to the excess carrier exists, without
indicating the source of the duty.8"
It seems reasonable to take the position that the duty to the excess
insurer is direct, rather than being derived from subrogation. It is clear
that if the insured has excess coverage he doesn't care if there is an
excess judgment. Thus, it seems rather peculiar that the excess carrier's
rights against the primary carrier should arise by stepping into the
shoes of the insured. The excess carrier is, however, a foreseeably in-
jured party if the primary carrier conducts settlement negotiations, or
discharges its other duties, negligently or in bad faith, and there should
be a direct cause of action against the primary carrier.
It appears that only one jurisdiction has held that the primary carrier
owes no duty to the excess carrier,8" and even there the authority of the
court's rejection of the duty is weakened because the fact situation was
atypical. In the usual situation, the insured has directly contracted for
a primary insurance policy and an excess insurance policy, and there is
no question about the contractual responsibilities of the insurers to the
insured.
In Universal Underwriters v. Dairyland Mutual Insurance Co. ,82 how-
ever, Dairyland Mutual insured the negligent driver of a vehicle, with a
policy limit of $10,000, and Universal Underwriters insured the owner
of this vehicle83 which caused an accident. Dairyland denied that its
coverage was applicable to the accident, and refused to defend.84 Uni-
76. See Portland Gen. Elec. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 579 F.2d 514,515 (9th Cir. 1978)(applying
Oregon law).
7. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 285 F.2d 579, 581 (10th Cir.
1960)(applying Oklahoma law). Contra, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 116 N.H. 806, 808,
373 A.2d 339, 340 (1977).
78. Transit Cas. Corp. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 156 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1979).
79. Id at 134, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 367. A subrogation theory might have resulted in no recov-
ery in Transit Casualty, because of the wrongful conduct of the insured.
80. Seegenerally St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. Martin, 190 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1951)(ap-
plying Oklahoma law); Offshore Logistics Services, Inc. v. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.,
46 91. Supp. 1099 (E.D. La. 1979); Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. North Star Reins. Corp., 90
Cal. App. 3d 786, 153 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1979); Citizens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 29
Mich. App. 91, 185 N.W.2d 99 (1970); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. &
Guar. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 977, 375 N.E.2d 733, 404 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1978).
81. See generally Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 102 Ariz. 518,
433 P.2d 966 (1967). This case was expressly followed in Rocky Mountain Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Dairyland Ins. Co., 452 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1971).
82. 102 Ariz. 518, 433 P.2d 966 (1967).
83. Under a garage liability policy.
84. The court subsequently held that, under Arizona law, the Dairyland policy was the pri-
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versal then settled with the claimant for $30,000, and sued Dairyland,
seeking to recover the full $30,000 on the theory that Dairyland was
guilty of bad faith to its insured (and, through the insured, to Univer-
sal) because it failed to defend and pay the judgment.
The court rejected this argument, and allowed Universal to recover
from Dairyland only the latter's policy limit of $10,000. The court
found it unnecessary to determine whether Dairyland had exercised
good faith toward its insured, since this would not affect the rights of
Universal, privity of contract between the insurers being absent. In the
court's view, the only duty which Dairyland owed to Universal was to
pay its $10,000 policy limit toward satisfaction of the judgment.
As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals properly recognized in Rocky
Mountain Fire & Casualty Co. v. Dairyland Insurance Co., the rejec-
tion by the Arizona Supreme Court of any duty of the primary insurer
to the excess insurer was clearly dictum.86 There was no indication that
settlement negotiations were impeded in any way by Dairyland's re-
fusal to defend, nor was there any showing that the claim could have
been settled for less than $30,000 if Dairyland had participated. There-
fore, the $20,000 excess of the settlement over Dairyland's policy limit
did not result from Dairyland's refusal to defend, and there would be
no basis for holding it liable therefor. It is doubtful if any jurisdiction
would have held Dairyland liable for the $20,000 excess under these
facts.
87
Thus, in all of the cases, only the dictum of Universal Underwriters
stands against the recognition of a duty of a primary insurer to protect
the interest of the excess insurer. And it can be questioned whether the
statement of the Arizona Supreme Court was really the "considered
dicta"88 which a federal court of appeals is bound to follow. 9
C. California Cases
A federal court in California recognized the duty of a primary in-
mary coverage and the Universal policy was excess. Therefore, Dairyland's refusal to defend was
wrongful.
85. 452 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1971).
86. The court of appeals considered itself "bound to follow the considered dicta as well as the
holdings of state court decisions" in a diversity case. Id at 603-04.
87. The decision in Rocky Mountain itself is highly suspect. The court overextended Univer-
sal Underwriters when it concluded that a general doctrine had been announced denying subroga-
tion in all instances. Since subrogation is an equitable doctrine, the decision in the state court case
should have been confined to the inequities of the situation before the court. The excess carrier
was simply asking for damages not caused by the primary carrier's failure to defend.
88. 452 F.2d at 603 (emphasis added).
89. The Arizona court said: "There is no privy [sic] of contract between these two insurance
companies nor is there any principle of law of which we are aware that would give Universal such
a windfall because of Dairyland's mistreatment of its insured." 102 Ariz. at 520, 433 P.2d at 968.
One wonders if that is really "considered" judicial language.
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surer to the excess insurer in 1974 in Peter v. Travelers Insurance Co. 9°
In that case, Travelers had primary coverage up to a limit of $250,000;
Lloyd's had the excess. While the claim against the insured was pend-
ing, Travelers changed its claims procedures so that a branch office
could settle for no more than $15,000 without home office approval.
The company's agent in Los Angeles told the home office that there
was a chance of avoiding liability, but that the value of the claim was
about $100,000. There was little other communication between the
branch and the home office; the home office did not authorize any pay-
ment over $15,000, so there were no real negotiations with the claim-
ant.91 The case was tried, judgment was entered for the claimant for
$407,000, and this was settled for about $388,000. Lloyd's, the excess
carrier, then sued Travelers, the primary carrier, for the $138,000 for
which it became liable because of Travelers' wrongful refusal to settle.
The district court said that under Crisci v. Security Insurance Co., 92
Travelers would be liable to the insured, since failure to even consider
what settlement would be reasonable is more clearly wrongful conduct
than the refusal of a reasonable offer.93 Because Lloyd's was subro-
gated to the right of the insured, Travelers must pay the full amount of
the loss, since the loss to the excess insurer was caused by Travelers'
refusal to negotiate above $1 5,000.
9 4
Another California decision, Lear Sinegler v. Employers Surplus
Lines Insurance Co., held that a first excess insurer owes the same
duty of good faith to a second excess insurer. In this case, the insured
had a $500,000 primary policy with Lumberman's Mutual and a first
excess policy with Employers Surplus Lines for an additional $500,000.
There was a second excess layer with Lloyd's affording coverage of
$4,000,000 in excess of the underlying first million.
Severe injuries had rendered the claimant a quadriplegic and his re-
covery appeared likely. He demanded $1,000,000 and the primary in-
surer offered its $500,000 primary limit, recommending that the first
excess layer make its limit available. Employers Surplus Lines refused
to extend settlement authority up to $500,000 and the case proceeded to
90. 375 F. Supp. 1347 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
91. There were apparently offers by the claimant to settle for something less than $225,000.
92. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
93. 375 F. Supp. at 1349.
94. Id at 1350. It should also be possible for an excess carrier to recover punitive damages
from a primary carrier if its action is based on a subrogation theory. Recovery of punitive dam-
ages was clearly recognized in Crisci. It appears that an excess carrier has sought punitive dam-
ages in only one case, Fireman's FundIns. Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 72 N.J. 63, 367 A.2d 864 (1976).
By stating that "the necessary requisites to an award of punitive damages are not present", the
court strongly implied that punitive damages would be awarded in a proper case. See generally id
95. No. C-68324 (Cal. Super. Ct. May, 1976).
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trial, resulting in a jury verdict of $2,733,131. Thereafter, Lloyd's set-
tled the case for $1,350,000 above the primary and first layer payments.
Proceeding on a subrogation theory, Lloyd's sued Employers Surplus
Lines and was awarded the full amount of $1,350,000 plus $270,000
interest.96
Further support for the duty of the primary insurer to the excess in-
surer was demonstrated in the next few years by both the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals97 and by three different districts of the California ap-
pellate courts.98 Hopefully, the California Supreme Court will adopt
this view99 if and when it is called upon to decide the issue.1°°
D. Choices of Action for the Excess Insurer
When a primary insurer breaches its duty to the excess insurer to
offer its full policy limit, if necessary, to effectuate a settlement, the
excess insurer has a choice: it can attempt to negotiate a settlement
with the claimant, and then recover the amount thereof from the pri-
mary carrier up to the primary policy limit;10' or it can wait until after
a judgment is entered against the insured, and then recover from the
primary carrier the amount by which the judgment exceeds the claim-
ant's offer of settlement, plus the amount of the primary policy limit.0 2
This does not mean that an excess insurer can settle for any amount
it chooses and automatically recover from the primary insurer its policy
limits. In order to recover, the excess insurer must prove that the
amount of the settlement was-reasonable, and that the primary insurer
96. No appeal was filed and Employers Surplus Lines agreed to make payment.
97. See generally Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1977).
98. See generally Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. North Star Reinsurance Corp., 90 Cal.
App. 3d 786, 153 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1979)(2d District); Transit Cas. Co. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal. App.
3d 124, 156 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1979)(3d District); Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group,
76 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 143 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1978)(4th District)(primary insurer has duty to exercise
good faith in allocating claims to certain policy years, since this allocation will affect liability of
excess carrier which must pay claims after aggregate of paid claims for a policy year exceeds limit
of primary coverage).
99. See text accompanying notes 135-145 infra for a discussion of the reasons supporting this
view.
100. Some question has been raised concerning the possible position of the California
Supreme Court because of its holding that the insureardoes not owe a duty to the excess insurer to
attempt to settle within the amount of a self-insured retention. See Commercial Union Assurance
Companies v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912, 921, 610 P.2d 1038, 1043, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709,
714 (1980). However, only the insured was involved in that appeal; the primary insurer was not.
There was no indication that the primary insurer, refused to participate in any proposed settle-
ment, or was guilty in any way of wrongful conduct. The California Supreme Court in Commer-
cial Union did not state its position on the primary/excess insurer relationship, and it seems
unlikely that it will have occasion to do so in any subsequent proceedings in this case. However,
the court's discussion of the appellate court cases involving the primary/excess relationship seems
to indicate its approval of the rule adopted therein imposing a duty on the primary insurer.
101. See generally Westerholm v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 58 Cal. App. 3d 628, 130 Cal. Rptr.
164 (1976); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 239 Cal. App. 2d 346, 48 Cal. Rptr. 667
(1966).
102. See generally Peter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
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therefor had a duty to pay the amount thereof, up to its policy limit.10 3
No showing of bad faith is required in this situation. "The only default
of the primary insurer [is its] refusal to contribute its policy limits to the
settlement arranged by the excess insurer, and the only injury suffered
by the excess insurer [is] the loss of the primary insurer's contribution
of its policy limits." 104 In order to recover from the primary insurer an
amount in excess of the primary limit, however, the excess insurer must
also show that the bad faith refusal of the primary insurer to tender its
policy limit was the cause of the resulting excess judgment. The pri-
mary insurer will be liable if its "unreasonable refusal to settle within
its policy limits resulted in loss to the excess insurer" because the excess
insurer was forced to pay an amount for which it would not otherwise
have been liable.105
Primary insurers have sometimes argued that they cannot be liable in
the event of a settlement because they did not authorize the settlement,
and the settlement did not arise out of a judgment against the insured,
as required by the policy. Courts have rejected this contention, stating
that when the potential loss and the proposed settlement far exceed the
policy limits, the excess insurer may, but need not, await the outcome
of the tort action against the insured. The excess insurer may also
make a good faith settlement above the primary policy limits. The de-
faulting primary insurer is fully protected by the requirement that the
excess insurer must prove that the settlement was negotiated in good
faith and for a reasonable amountY°6
DUTY OF THE INSURED TO THE INSURER
A. Is There a Duty?
The relationship between insured and insurer as concerns a deducti-
ble is not significantly different from the excess/primary relationship.
It is obvious that in the primary/excess situation, the primary is merely
acting as a sort of "deductible". Thus, the duty owed by an insured to
contribute its deductible towards a settlement should be identical to the
duty owed by a primary carrier to contribute to a settlement arranged
by the excess carrier. Therefore, where the duty of the primary carrier
to the excess carrier is recognized, as is almost universally the case, 10 7 a
103. See, eg., 58 Cal. App. 3d at 628, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 164; 239 Cal. App. 2d at 346, 48 Cal.
Rptr. at 667; Continental Cas. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 5, 238 N.W.2d 862 (1976).
104. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group, 76 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 1049, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 415, 426 (1978).
105. Id at 1050, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
106. See generaly Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 72 N.J. 63, 367 A.2d 864
(1976).
107. See note 62 supra.
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comparable duty of the insured to its insurer should also be recognized.
Even without an analogy to the primary/excess relationship, the in-
sured should owe a duty to its insurer. Under the basic law of contri-
bution and indemnity, a person who bears a loss because of the
wrongful conduct of another has a remedy against the latter. Clearly,
an insured's unreasonable refusal to offer its deductible in settlement
should be deemed wrongful conduct by the insured.
It is fundamental that an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing forms a part of every insurance agreement. This covenant re-
quires that neither the insurer nor the insured do anything to injure the
right of the other to receive the benefit of the contract of insurance. 1
0 8
The well recognized obligation of an insurer to attempt good faith set-
tlement of lawsuits brought against its insured derives from this im-
plied covenant.
Beyond this reciprocal obligation 0 9 of good faith and fair dealing,
an insurer also has a right to insist upon the reasonable cooperation of
the insured" 0 which is correlative to the insurer's duty to defend law-
suits brought against the insured."' Given the insured's duty to rea-
sonably cooperate, the conclusion is clear that an insured must have an
obligation to tender the full amount of its deductible towards a reason-
able settlement negotiated by the carrier.
Failure to tender a deductible towards a reasonable settlement is a
breach of the insured's duties to the insurer. For example, the insurer's
right to the cooperation of the insured has been held to prohibit an
insured from arbitrarily demanding settlement on its own terms and
conditions without consideration of the interests of the carrier. 12 It has
also been held that the refusal, in bad faith, of an insured to contribute
to a settlement over policy limits bars the insured from claiming, after a
failure to settle and an excess judgment, that the insurer acted in bad
108. See generally 375 F. Supp. at 1347; Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d
173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. North Star Reinsurance Corp., 90
Cal. App. 3d 786, 153 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1979).
109. Transit Cas. Co. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 131, 156 Cal. Rptr. 360, 364
(1979)("The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not burden the carrier alone; it
is reciprocal, binding the policyholder as well as the carrier.")
110. A typical cooperation clause provides that "the insured shall cooperate with the company
and, upon the company's request, assist in making settlements." R. KEETOMN, INSURANCE LAW:
BAsic TEXr app. G, at 655 (1971).
The phrase "shall. . . assist in making settlements" clearly encompasses a direct obligation to
act in good faith in tendering a deductible amount towards a reasonable settlement. Thus, the
arbitrary refusal to tender a deductible would appear to constitute a breach of the standard coop-
eration clause.
111. See generally Larraburu Bros., Inc. v. Royal Indem. Co., 604 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1979).
112. See Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Redco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621, 626 (10th Cir. 1942).
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faith in not settling within policy limits.1 3 Since the unreasonable re-
fusal of an insured to contribute any or all of its deductible to a settle-
ment in excess of the deductible amount is tantamount to a refusal to
settle except upon the terms and conditions set by the insured, it should
be considered as a breach of the duty to act in good faith.
14
If a settlement negotiated by the insurer is reasonable from the
standpoint of the merits and the insured's best interests, the only reason
for the failure by the insured to tender all of its deductible would be to
capriciously gamble, at the expense of the insurer, for a verdict less
than the deductible amount. The insured will be legally liable for the
deductible whether the case is settled at the recommended figure, set-
tled at another figure above the deductible amount, or tried through to
judgment in excess of the deductible. Unless the insured will also be
held responsible for any excess, only the insurer's money is at risk. On
the other hand, the insurer is given the choice of settling the case and
contributing more than its fair share of the settlement amount, or not
settling and risking a much higher judgment at trial. Even if the case
does settle at a later point, the insurer will be forced to pay additional
legal costs and, because additional costs will have been incurred by the
claimant, it is highly likely that the claimant will insist upon a higher
settlement figure even if the case does eventually settle. Putting it sim-
ply, the insured blackmails the insurer when it refuses to tender its de-
ductible amount.
It may be argued that an insured has no implied good faith duty to
contribute its deductible towards a reasonable settlement because the
insured does not control the litigation. 15 This argument does not with-
stand scrutiny. First, the insured does control the decision of whether
or not it will contribute its deductible. Second, the insured exercises a
degree of actual control over the entire litigation when it refuses to
tender all or part of its deductible towards a reasonable settlement.
This also gives rise to the duty to act in good faith.
113. See generally Riley v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 420 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 928 (1970); Knobloch v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 46 A.D.2d 278, 362 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1974).
114. This discussion assumes the insurer has reasonably attempted to induce the insured to
tender its deductible. See Young v. American Cas. Co., 416 F.2d 906, 910 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 997 (1970).
115. The right of an insurer to control the lawsuit is often given as one of the reasons for the
requirement that an insurer has a duty to settle in good faith. The basis for judicial imposition on
liability insurers ofa duty to exercise good faith or due care with respect to opportuies to settle
within the'policy limits is that "the company has exclusive control over the decision concerning
settlement within policy coverage, and company and insured often have confficting interests as towhether settlement should b  made." Kedton, supra ote 32, at 1138.
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B. California Cases
In line with the generally accepted view that the insured owes a duty
of good faith to its insurer, a California appellate court recently held
that an insurer has a cause of action against its insured where the in-
sured wrongfully refuses to tender its deductible amount to effect a rea-
sonable settlement."1 6 In Transit Casualty, the insured had a $15,000
deductible, there was $100,000 primary coverage, and $1,000,000 excess
coverage. It appeared that the claim could have been settled for
$300,000, but both the insured and the primary insurer refused. The
insured said that its refusal to settle was based on the opinion of its
insurance broker, a specialist in professional liability coverage, that set-
tlement of the claim might impair its future insurability, and might also
be harmful to the engineering industry generally. 117 However, no evi-
dence was offered at trial that this was true, so the court found that it
was bad faith for the insured to refuse to settle. The court held that the
insured had a duty to attempt to settle a claim, even though the policy
had a clause requiring the insured's consent to any settlement. 18 The
court construed this clause narrowly, since there is a public interest in
settling lawsuits, and stated that it would not permit an unreasonable
rejection of a settlement offer. Thus, the insured would be liable to the
insurer 1 9 for any injury suffered by the latter because of the insured's
unreasonable refusal to settle.
1 20
The view that the insured owes a duty of good faith to its insurer
received further support from a California appellate court in Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals v. North Star Reinsurance Corp.121 In this case,
the insured hospital had primary coverage with a limit of $1,000,000
for the aggregate of all claims within a policy year, subject to a $25,000
deductible for each malpractice claim. It also had a policy covering the
excess over the deductible and primary coverage. The excess carrier
claimed that the insured and primary insurer, by improperly assigning
one or more claims to a certain policy year, had exhausted the annual
aggregate limit and thus brought the excess policy into play prema-
turely. In reversing the judgment of the trial court because of error in
116. See generally Transit Cas. Co. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 156 Cal. Rptr. 360
(1979).
117. Insured was a firm of consulting engineers which was sued in connection with a construc-
tion site accident. The insurers carried its professional liability insurance.
118. The policy provided that, if consent was refused, the insurer would only be liable for the
amount it would have paid if the settlement had been approved. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 129 n.1, 144
Cal. Rptr. at 363 n.l.
119. In this case, the excess insurer.
120. It appeared that the excess insurer may have been contributorily negligent in its handling
of the claim. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence, this might reduce the recovery from
the insured. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 138, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
121. 90 Cal. App. 3d 786, 153 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1979).
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the admission of evidence, the court said that "[t]here can be no ques-
tion that. the duty of good faith and fair dealing was owed to the
excess insurer by. . . the. . . insured as well as by. . . the primary
insurer."122
The first harbinger of a contrary position came in Commercial Union
Assurance Companies v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 23 and the rejection of
any duty of an insured to settle became the law of California when the
California Supreme Court adopted the opinion of the appellate court in
affirming its judgment.124 In Commercial Union, the California
Supreme Court expressly disapproved Transit Casualy as to its holding
that an insured has a duty to its insurer to attempt in good faith to
settle. 125 It also distinguished Kaiser 26 and another case,127 indicating
that the duty of good faith required by those cases was for the insured
not to "engage in unconscionable acts which would subvert the legiti-
mate rights and expectations of the . . insurance carrier."'
128
The court in Commercial Union thus accepted the fact that the duty
of good faith and fair dealing runs in both directions between insured
and insurer, but felt that the extent of the duty depends on the contract
between the parties, and their legitimate expectations arising there-
from. 129 The insured buys liability insurance for the purpose of pro-
tecting himself, and can reasonably expect that, in the conduct of the
defense and settlement of the claim, the insurer will give him the great-
est protection possible. 30 The insurer, however, cannot reasonably ex-
pect the insured to accept a settlement offer in order to protect the
insurer from exposure, as such "protection. . . is simply not the object
of the bargain."' 31 It is the view of the California Supreme Court that
the insurer did not issue its policy with any expectation of favorable
treatment by the insured, and that the insured did not in any way
122. Id at 792, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
123. 26 Cal. 3d 912, 610 P.2d 1038, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1980).
124. Id There was $50,000 primary coverage, $50,000 self-insured retention, and $100,000 to
$20,000,000 excess coverage. It was alleged that the claim could have been settled for no more
than $60,000. The case was tried and judgment entered for $125,000. Excess insurer sued insured
and primary insurer for the $25,000 it was required to pay on the judgment.
125. Id at 921, 610 P.2d at 1043, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
126. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. North Star Reinsurance Corp., 90 Cal. App. 3d 786, 153
Cal. Rptr. 678 (1979).
127. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Altfillisch Constr. Co., 70 Cal. App. 3d 789, 139 Cal. Rptr. 91
(1977).
128. Commercial Union Assurance Companies v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912, 921,
610 P.2d -1038, 1043, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709, 714 (1980). In Kaiser, the breach of faith was "the
aggravated conduct on the part of the insured and the primary carrier in taking advantage of the
excess carrier." Id at 920, 610 P.2d at 1043, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 714. In Liberty Mutual, the breach
was an action taken by the insured which cut off the insurer's right of subrogation, contrary to an
express subrogation clause in the insurance policy.
129. Id at 918, 610 P.2d at 1041, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
130. Id
131. Id at 919, 610 P.2d at 1042, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
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promise that it would attempt to settle to protect the insurer. 132 In fact,
the court expressly states its belief that "the primary reason excess in-
surance is purchased is to provide an available pool of money in the
event that the decision is made to take the gamble of litigating.
' '1 33
Thus, the California Supreme Court seems to have given carte
blanche to insureds to refuse to tender a deductible amount in settle-
ment, and to proceed to litigate any claim to the last ounce of the in-
surer's resources.134 It seems highly questionable if this really reflects
the reasonable expectations of the parties to the insurance contract, and
such a rule is also open to serious criticism as a matter of public policy.
THERE SHOULD BE A DUTY BETWEEN PRIMARY AND EXCESS
INSURER AND BETWEEN INSURED AND INSURER
Two basic principles of negligence law, which are clearly accepted in
California as well as many other states, seem to compel the recognition
of a duty by a primary insurer to an excess insurer and by an insured to
its insurer to make a good faith effort to settle a claim and thereby
protect the other party's interest.
(1) Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful
acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordi-
nary care or skill in the management of his property or person, ex-
cept so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care,
brought the injury upon himself.
3 5
(2) Reasonable foreseeability of harm creates a duty of care.'
36
132. Id at 920, 610 P.2d at 1042, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 713. The only other case which expresses a
similar view is Hayes Bros., Inc. v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 634 F.2d 1119 (8th Cir. 1980)(apply-
ing Iowa law). In Hayes, the court said that the insured is not held to the same standard as the
insurer for failure to accept a settlement demand. However, this is probably dictum, and in any
case is not applicable to a deductible situation. Id. at 1124. In Hayes, there was $50,000 of insur-
ance coverage; insurer rejected offers to settle within this policy limit; shortly before trial, there
was an offer to settle for $90,000, and insurer tendered its $50,000 policy limit; insured refused to
pay $40,000; in view of the prior bad faith of the insurer in refusing to settle, it is doubtful if the
insured was guilty of bad faith toward the insurer in refusing to pay $40,000 toward a last-minute
settlement.
133. 26 Cal. 3d at 919, 610 P.2d at 1042, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 713. It can well be argued that the
rule of Commercial Union should be limited to its particular facts ($50,000 primary coverage, then
a $50,000 self-insured layer, then $20,000,000 excess coverage). Perhaps such a buyer of insurance
is indeed buying the opportunity to gamble on litigating any claim it wishes. It is doubtful if the
same could be said of an insured in the more common situation, where perhaps the deductible is
$5,000, the primary coverage is $100,000, and there is no excess coverage at all. The fact that the
court repeatedly refers to the "duty owed to an excess insurance carrier" at least provides a basis
for limiting the application of the decision in Commercial Union.
134. An insurer could impose a duty of good faith settlement on the insured by using appro-
priate express language in the policy. Id at 921, 610 P.2d at 1043, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
135. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 111-12, 443 P.2d 561, 563, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99
(1968).
136. See Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40,46,539 P.2d 36, 41, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468,471
(1975); Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 399, 525 P.2d 669, 680, 115 Cal. Rptr.
765, 776 (1974); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739-41, 441 P.2d 912, 919-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79-
81(1968).
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Application of these principles to the insured/primary/excess relation-
ship should lead to "reciprocal duties of care in the conduct of settle-
ment negotiations when a damage claim threatens to exceed" a
deductible amount or the limit of primary coverage, since in such case
injury to another party is reasonably foreseeable. 137
This view is supported by important policy considerations underly-
ing our judicial and liability insurance systems. First, when the insured
or primary insurer breaches its good faith duty to settle it imperils the
public interest in fair and reasonable settlement of lawsuits. Faced
with a refusal to settle by the insured or primary insurer, the other
party involved in the insurance coverage must either proceed to trial
and be sure of full payment of the deductible or primary limit, or pay
the full amount of a settlement itself and risk losing the contribution of
the deductible or primary limit.
13 8
Second, notions of equity and fair play require that a party not be
permitted to gamble with the money of another.1 39 When there is an
offer to settle at or near the amount of the deductible or primary limit,
the insured or primary carrier has a strong incentive to refuse settle-
ment and go to trial, since it has nothing to lose. It seems only fair in
such a situation to force it to gamble with its own money, by holding it
responsible for any injury to the other party resulting from its refusal to
settle. The reasoning here should be exactly the same as in requiring
an insurer to give full consideration to the interest of its insured. 140
Third, holding insureds and primary insurers to a duty to make a
good faith attempt to settle will reduce the cost of defense of claims. If
no such duty is imposed, an insurer with a deductible, or an excess
insurer, will be forced to participate fully in the defense and settlement
negotiations, rather than relying, at least to some extent, on the han-
dling of the claim by the insured or primary insurer. This participation
will substantially increase defense costs.
Fourth, failure to recognize a duty to settle will distort insurance pre-
mium rate structures. Insurers charge lower rates for excess cover-
137. Transit Cas. Co. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 134, 156 Cal. Rptr. 360, 366 (1979).
138. If the case proceeds to trial, and judgment is entered for an amount exceeding the deduct-
ible or primary limit, as the case may be, the insured or primary carrier will have to pay, just as if
there had been no settlement offer. If the insurer settles, however, and thereafter seeks to recover
the deductible or primary coverage, it will succeed in doing so only if it establishes that the settle-
ment was reasonable and that it was bad faith for the other party to refuse to settle. Given this
perilous choice, many insurers would elect to go to trial rather than settle.
139. Contra, Commercial Union Assurance Companies v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d
912, 919, 610 P.2d 1038, 1042, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709, 713 (1980). See notes 132-133 and accompany-
ing text supra.
140. See generally Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967).
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age, 14 1 or for policies with a deductible clause, because they expect to
pay out less in claims than they would if they covered the insured expo-
sure from the first dollar of every claim. Their rates are based, how-
ever, on the reasonable expectation that the defense and settlement of
claims will be handled just the same as if one party were to bear the
entire liability for any settlement or judgment. This rate structure does
not envision a rule which permits another party to greatly expand the
insurer's potential liability.
142
Fifth, as to the duty of a primary insurer to the excess insurer, the
premium has been structured to take into account the fact that the pri-
mary insurance company will be undertaking the duty of investigation
of the claim and the defense of the litigation, including the payment of
defense attorneys' fees and expenses. 43 Recognizing this fact, the ex-
cess insurer's premiums are normally established on the basis of what
the liability exposure for loss payment would be, taking into considera-
tion the fact that information regarding the investigation and defense
will be obtained from the primary insurer's representatives, including
its defense counsel.'"
It is sometimes suggested that a rule which puts pressure on the in-
sured or primary insurer to settle will encourage claimants to make un-
reasonable demands for settlement at or near the deductible or primary
limit, and that such demands will be accepted for fear of the insured or
primary insurer being responsible for an excess judgment if the de-
mand is refused. This same argument has been made in cases involv-
ing the duty of the insurer to protect the insured, and the courts have
repeatedly rejected it.' 45 There is no indication that imposition of a
duty to settle on either insurer or insured has had a measurable effect
on claims experience. And even if it did lead to some increase in the
141. This is the case as to both a "true" primary/excess insurance relationship, where one
insured is covered by several policies, one expressly affording primary coverage and the other
expressly affording excess coverage, and the primary/excess relationship which results when two
policies insure two insureds but, by policy provision or by operation of law, one becomes primary
and the other excess, (e.g., where an owner and driver of a vehicle each is insured by his own
policy). In the latter case, each policy was intended to provide primary coverage to its named
insured. However, both insurers knew their policies would provide primary coverage in some
instances and excess coverage in others, and their total premiums were presumably set with that in
mind. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group, 76 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 1047-48, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 415, 424-25 (1978).
142. See Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292, 298 (9th Cir. 1977); Continental Cas. Co.
v. Reserve Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 5, 9, 238 N.W.2d 862, 865 (1976).
143. The primary insurer normally has the sole right to negotiate settlements. Peter v. Travel-
ers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347, 1350 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
144. Transit Cas. Co. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 135, 156 Cal. Rptr. 360, 367
(1979)("The premium charged by the primary insurer supports more localized claim adjustment
facilities than those of the excess carrier.").
145. See generall, Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America, 65 N.J. 474, 323
A.2d 495 (1974).
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amount paid out in settlements, this increase would be offset, in whole
or in part, by savings in litigation costs and damage awards.
STRICT LIABILITY SHOULD BE THE STANDARD
As we have indicated previously, there has been considerable sup-
port for applying a rule of strict liability to the duty of an insurer to its
insured to accept an offer of settlement within its policy limit. 146 Ac-
cording to this view, if an insurer rejects a claimant's offer to settle
within the policy limit, the insurer will thereafter be liable for the full
amount of any judgment against the insured, without regard to whether
or not the insurer acted in good faith. The reasoning is that any loss
which results from the insurer's decision to contest the claim should be
borne by those who stand to gain from taking the risk, i.e., the insurer
and its policyholders. 47 This position seems eminently sound, and the
same reasoning supports application of strict liability to the in-
sured/insurer and primary/excess situations.
In all three cases, the party who is secondarily liable has a right to
expect that the party who is primarily liable will offer the amount of its
coverage or deductible where necessary to effect an end to the litiga-
tion.148 The party who is primarily liable should not be permitted to
further its own interests by rejecting opportunities to settle within the
policy limits or deductible unless it is also willing to absorb losses
which may result from its failure to settle. 49
This view also helps to eliminate the serious conflict of interest
problems which are inherent in these situations. 50 A settlement is al-
most always in the best interest of the party secondarily liable, because
this will assure its non-liability, but it will often be in the interest of the
party primarily liable not to settle.' 51 This is especially true as the offer
146. See generaly Note, Excess Liabili yr Reconsideration of Calffornias Bad Faith Negigence
Rule, 18 STAN. L. REv. 475, 483 (1966). See notes 48-56 and accompanyin text supra.
147. Insurance companies sometimes adopt "no settlement" or "selective settlement" pro-
grams to numb the public's claim-consciousness, to discourage fraudulent claims, to create a tight-
fisted image for plaintiffs' attorneys, or to establish favorable legal precedents. A strict liability
rule would protect the insured from these "institutional considerations" which often affect settle-
ment decisions.
148. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 431,426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17
(1967).
149. Id
150. In most legal relationships determination of the merits of conflicting interests by one
of the parties to the conflict is forbidden. No man can be judge in his own case; no
trustee may weigh his personal interest against that of his beneficiary; no agent may
evaluate his personal profit against that of his principal; and no public officer may bal-
ance private gain against public interest.
Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 874, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511, 521 (1973).
151. Id at 870, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 519 (it is always in the interests of the insured to settle). In
Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America, 65 N.J. 474, 498, 323 A.2d 495, 508
(1974), the court stated:
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to settle nears or reaches the limit of primary liability.
A rule of strict liability will also eliminate the substantial burden of
proving bad faith or negligence which the traditional standards impose
on a party who seeks to recover the amount of a judgment in excess of
the primary liability. Under a strict liability standard, the party secon-
darily liable will meet its burden of proof simply by establishing that
the party primarily liable rejected an offer of settlement within the limit
of the primary liability. 52
Strict liability would eliminate the confused and unpredictable re-
sults reached under traditional standards of liability. It would also
eliminate the uncertainty and problems in interpretation of traditional
standards of liability. The strict liability standard is clear and easy to
apply to any excess liability case. If the injured party's demand is be-
low the primary policy limit or deductible, the party primarily liable
will be responsible for any subsequent judgment if it rejects that de-
mand. This would be the sole factual determination necessary in an
excess liability case if a strict liability standard were adopted.'
5 3
Some courts and commentators have expressed the fear that strict
liability will cause a substantial increase in insurance companies' costs
and, consequently, an increase in premiums. 154 Although cost predic-
tions are extremely difficult to make, careful analysis suggests that any
such increase would be small, if indeed there was any increase at all.
The party primarily liable is already held responsible for an excess
judgment in a substantial portion of the cases which have applied a bad
faith or negligence standard,'55 and it seems unlikely that recoveries
Yet however much the carrier considers the interests of its insured in pondering the
decision as to settlement, the moment it decides not to settle, it in effect, however reason-
ably, sacrifices the interests of the insured in order to promote its own. It is always to the
benefit of the insured to settle and thereby avoid the danger of an excess verdict.
152. Strict liability is currently the rule where an excess carrier arranges a reasonable settle-
ment and then seeks to recover the amount of the primary limit from the primary carrier. The
excess carrier need only show that settlement was reasonable and that the amount was equal to or
in excess of the primary limit. See generaly Westerholm v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 58 Cal. App. 3d
628, 130 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1976); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 239 Cal. App. 2d 346,
48 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1966).
Only where the excess carrier attempts to recover an amount in excess of the policy limits of the
primary insurer does it have to show that the primary carrier refused in bad faith to contribute its
policy limits. See generally Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers' Ins. Group, 76 Cal. App. 3d
1031, 143 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1978).
153. 66 Cal. 2d at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
154. See, e.g., Blue Bird Taxi Corp. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 26 F. Supp. 808, 810
(E.D.S.C. 1939); Comment, Insurance" Excess Recovery-Liability Insurer Who Refused Settle-
ment Jfithin the Policy Limits HeldLiablefor Excess Recovery and Mental Damages, 43 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 199, 204 (1968); Comment, Strict Liabilityfor Insurance Companiesin Excess Judgment Suits,
23 U. FLA. L. REv. 201, 205-06 (1970).
155. For insurer/insured cases in which the insurer was absolved of liability, see generally
Murach v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 339 Mass. 184, 158 N.E.2d 338 (1959); Knobloch v.
Royal Globe Ins. Co., 46 A.D.2d 278, 362 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1974). See note 56 supra.
For primary/excess cases in which the primary insurer was absolved of liability, see generally
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will be materially increased under strict liability. Furthermore, any in-
crease in costs of settlement would be offset by avoiding expensive liti-
gation costs, such as attorneys' fees and investigation expenses.
5 6
CONCLUSION
In the insured/insurer and primary insurer/excess insurer relation-
ships, a rule of "triangular reciprocity" should be applied." 7 Each
party to the relationship should have mutual obligations to the other
parties, and these obligations should include a duty to settle within the
limits of that party's liability where such a settlement is possible.
Where a party fails to meet its duty to accept a reasonable settle-
ment,'58 it should be liable for the full amount of any judgment entered
thereafter.
When the party with primary liability chooses not to settle, and
thereby gambles on the outcome of litigation, it seems reasonable that
it should "bear the unhappy financial result of that unilateral decision,
since it alone profits from [a successful] result of the gamble."' 5 9 Such
a rule enables the party primarily liable "to pursue its own interests
.. . without sacrificing those of [the party secondarily liable].2
160
Nor will the proposed rules force the party primarly liable to accept
every offer of settlement which is within its limit of liability.' 6' Unrea-
sonable settlement demands will still be rejected when a party's best
judgment indicates a good chance of a better result in further negotia-
Offshore Logistics Servs., Inc. v. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 469 F. Supp. 1099 (E.D.
La. 1979); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Ohio St. 2d 221, 404 N.E.2d 759 (1980).
156. See Kelly, The Workable Sanction and Solution in Excess i'ability Cases: Strict Liablity
for Insurance Carriers, 10 U.S.F. L. REv. 159, 167 (1975); Comment, Crisci's Dicta of Strict labil-
ityfor Isurers'Failure to Settle: A Move TowardRational Settlement Behavior, 43 WASH. L. REV.
799, 815 (1968).
157. Transit Cas. Co. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 134, 156 Cal. Rptr. 360, 366 (1979).
158. 66 Cal. 2d at 430, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
159. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.L 474,500,323 A.2d 495, 509
(1974).
160. Id The court added:
It is contended by some that a new rule, requiring the carrier in all cases to bear the
financial consequences of its failure to offer its policy in settlement, will make it easier
for plaintifi' counsel to extract money from insurers by means of nuisance suits, will
increase claims costs, and will thereby raise premium ratel substantially. We note, how-
ever, that under the doctrine presently in force the company, supposedly, is already mak-
ing settlement decisions as though it would be liable for the entire sum of any adverse
verdict. Therefore, a carrier should be no more willing to settle under such a broadened
rule than it is at present, and should in such an event prove no easier prey to unreasona-
ble plaintiff demands than now. Were a carrier to settle more often or at higher figures
than it presently does, this fact would only suggest that the company has been ignoring
the standards set forth by the Court.
Id at 500 n.7, 323 A.2d at 509 n.7.
161. See Comment, Insurer's Strict Liabilityfor Entire Judgment, 13 SAN Dmoo L. REv. 375,
380 (1968)(suggesting that injured parties will make high demands to provoke rejection, thus ex-
posing the insurer to excess judgment liability).
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tion or litigation. And most claimants will continue to keep their de-
mands at reasonable levels rather than risk a judgment for an amount
less than the proposed settlement.'
62
Each party to the liability insurance relationship has a reasonable
expectation that no other party will be permitted to further its own in-
terests by rejecting settlement opportunities unless it is also willing to
absorb losses which may result from its failure to settle. 163 Elementary
justice requires that, where the interests of the parties conflict, he who
"may reap the benefits... should also suffer the detriments of [his]
decision. '""6
162. Or even worse, a judgment for the defendant.
163. 66 Cal. 2d at 430, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17 (argument proposed by amicus
curiae).
164. Id

